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In this article, we reinterpret the current political turn in animal rights theory in terms of republican as 
opposed to liberal political theory. By appealing to the values of liberty and fraternity as well as 
equality, we argue for a conception of animal liberation from human domination and not from human-
ity per se. This establishes a basis of liberty and fraternity in our cooperative relationships with ani-
mals in a “zoopolis,” or interspecies political community. We contend that such a basis for interspe-
cies political cooperation is not available on the more traditional model of animal liberation, where 
rights are derived from weak equality of the species.   
Keywords: 
INTRODUCTION 
Liberalism and republicanism both appeal to a triad 
of values in formulating the rights of human persons 
and citizens: liberty, equality, and fraternity. But animal 
rights theory focuses extensively on equality to the det-
riment of liberty and fraternity. Here, equality for ani-
mals appeals to species egalitarianism where humans and 
animals are on a morally equal baseline. Animals come 
up short, however, when it comes to the value of liberty 
understood as exercising the powers of autonomy or ra-
tional self-direction (Smith, 2012). Likewise, when it 
comes to fraternity with animals as members of the 
same political community (or “zoopolis”), the problem 
of animals lacking the autonomy necessary for citizen-
ship and civic participation prevents this value from be-
ing realized (Hinchcliffe, 2015). Consequently, all that 
remains is a weak basis of species egalitarianism suffi-
cient to ascribe rights—as legally protected statutes—to 
animals. But this entails recognizing that animals cannot 
meaningfully enter into political community with hu-
mans.  
This kind of assessment is challenged, however, by 
the recent “political turn” in animal rights (Hobson, 
2007; Cochrane, 2013; Wissenburg, 2014). The turn at-
tempts to broaden the appeal to values besides equality, 
highlighting instead the important role to be played by 
liberty and fraternity. So far, this broadened appeal to 
liberty and fraternity has been articulated in terms of lib-
eral theory. In this paper, however, we rearticulate the 
appeal to liberty and fraternity, characteristic of the po-
litical turn in animal rights, in terms of neo-republican 
theory. We believe that by taking the political turn in a 
republican direction we can offer an account superior to 
liberalism of the triad of liberty, equality, and fraternity 
in our relations with animals. Our neo-republican ac-
count goes beyond the ascription of animal rights on the 
basis of weak species egalitarianism. We argue that the 
mere ascription of rights to animals necessarily leaves 
them systemically or structurally dominated within the 
zoopolis. But there are significant hurdles to arguing for 
a republican conception that makes sense of non-
dominating relations with animals. In particular, it would 
appear that the basis of egalitarianism between human 
and non-human animals is so weak that there is no plau-
sible basis for interspecies reciprocity. Non-domination 
requires reciprocity between those who assign rights and 
statuses and those to whom these are assigned in the sense 
that the latter must be able to challenge the assignments 
made by the former (see for example Pettit, 1999; Rich-
ardson, 2002; Bohman, 2007). But non-human animals 
cannot plausibly perform this task of challenging the 
rights assigned to them by humans, with the conse-
quence that there is no reciprocity sufficient to warrant 
talking about an interspecies relationship of non-
domination.  
In this connection, Wissenburg (2014) has argued 
that any attempt to advance a neo-republican conception 
of animal non-domination must necessarily fail— in-
deed, that our relationships with animals are unavoidably 
dominating, resembling feudalism rather than republi-
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canism. Justified on paternalistic and anthropocentric 
grounds, such relations may be rendered benign, but 
they are nonetheless unavoidably relations of domina-
tion. Contrary to this view of feudalism for animals, 
however, we contend that non-dominating interspecies 
relations are both feasible and desirable. We argue that 
the incapacity of non-human animals to challenge the 
rights and statuses assigned to them by human policy-
makers presents no insurmountable obstacle to animal 
non-domination, given a sufficiently nuanced under-
standing of their vulnerabilities to domination in a zo-
opolis.  
We proceed in the following steps. Section 1 exam-
ines animal liberation and rights in the work of Singer 
and Regan as well as various forms of liberal contractu-
alism in light of the idea of species egalitarianism. Sec-
tion 2 considers the extreme consequence of this focus 
on egalitarianism in abolitionism and extinctionism, po-
sitions which advocate for the liberation of animals from 
all human interference. We then refocus on the ideas of 
liberty and fraternity over equality in the political turn in 
animal rights theory. From here, in Section 3 we develop 
a neo-republican route to animal non-domination by 
considering the possibilities of interpersonal and system-
ic domination with respect to subjects of interference 
who are not also political agents. In Section 4 we con-
sider an objection to the republican route, replying to 
this objection in the final Section 5.  All in all, we pro-
vide an account of the prospects for liberating animals 
from human domination rather than humanity per se. This 
establishes a basis of liberty and fraternity in our coop-
erative relationships with animals in a zoopolis, or inter-
species political community. Such a basis for interspecies 
political cooperation is not available on the more tradi-
tional model of animal liberation, where rights derive 
from weak equality of the species.   
1. SPECIES EGALITARIANISM AND
CONTRACTUALISM 
Contemporary animal rights theory has its origin in 
the idea of species egalitarianism, placing humans and 
animals on an equal moral level (Coeckelbergh, 2009). 
The premise of such egalitarianism is that— provided 
they meet a threshold of sentience (Singer, 1975) or can 
be construed as the subjects-of-a-life (Regan, 1983)— 
members of the human and animal community are 
equally morally considerable subjects, and rights-holders 
by extension. Here, species egalitarianism was immedi-
ately linked to politics insofar as it was the basis of the 
animal liberation movement. By comparison with hu-
man liberation movements, equality of the species was 
equated with gender equality and racial equality 
(Fjellstrom, 2002). Nonetheless, as tied to the political 
goal of animal liberation, species egalitarianism did not 
emerge from liberal political theory as much as from 
philosophical ethics. Its principal proponents were Peter 
Singer (1975) and Tom Regan (1983) who, respectively, 
argued for the equal moral considerability of all species 
on the basis of animal interests and moral claims about 
animal rights. But, in Singer and Regan alike, species 
egalitarianism turned out to be of a fairly weak sort. In-
deed, they both considered humans and animals to be 
equal only in some ethically significant respects, such as 
a common interest in not suffering or a moral claim not 
to have suffering needlessly inflicted on them. Certainly, 
this did not allow for equality between humans and ani-
mals in terms of civic participation. All in all, equal mor-
al considerability resulted in equal treatment for humans 
and animals only when they had the same interests or in-
terests of some equivalent weight or importance.  
Despite the weak character of its egalitarianism, the 
model of animal rights in philosophical ethics provides 
an indispensable foundation for the subsequent political 
turn on both liberal and republican interpretations. 
Without such a minimal baseline of equality between 
humans and animals, it is unlikely that the extension of 
rights to other creatures would have gained hold at all. 
But, while laying this foundation, animal rights encoun-
tered an obstacle in the dominant contractualism of lib-
eral theory. After all, contract proved to be deeply am-
bivalent regarding species egalitarianism and animal 
rights. On the one hand, it could be thought to deny 
egalitarianism and political rights for animals on the 
ground that the framers of any contract, determining the 
principles of justice, must be rational agents tasked with 
selecting principles for all other rational agents (Abbey, 
2007). In contractualism, this means that the framers are 
representatives of ordinary citizens having to select prin-
ciples of justice in an original position with its veil of ig-
norance. Here, such representative citizens know the 
general truths of psychology, sociology, and economics. 
But they do not know particular facts about themselves, 
including their conception of the good, their socio-
economic status, or even their sex and race. Behind this 
veil of ignorance, they thus have to select principles that 
would be fair to all rational agents, regardless of particu-
lar differences of class, sex, race, and so on. But this 
contractualist framework presupposes inegalitarianism of 
species, along with the inapplicability of political rights 
and justice to animals. At any rate, it does so to the ex-
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tent that animals are not rational agents, analogous to 
citizens (Scruton, 2000; Ladwig, 2015).  
On the other hand, however, contractualism could 
just as well be thought to affirm species egalitarianism 
and the political rights of animals. This follows if it is 
denied that the contractualist approach applies only to 
rational subjects, even if the framers of a contract have 
to be conceived as subjects of this sort. So, for example, 
Mark Rowlands (1997) argues that the veil of ignorance 
should be thickened to include species membership 
among the list of informational constraints on what rep-
resentative citizen selecting the principles of justice may 
know. In this respect, he appeals to the Rawlsian intui-
tion that individuals should not benefit from the posses-
sion of characteristics, such as rational agency, for which 
they are not responsible. In other words, it is morally ar-
bitrary for rational agents to benefit from their rationali-
ty and agency, so that equal moral considerability of an-
imals is achieved by placing these human characteristics 
behind the veil (Garner, 2013). Nonetheless, species 
egalitarianism remains of a weak sort, at least insofar as 
the rational agency of the representatives behind the veil 
of ignorance is an ethically relevant characteristic of hu-
mans qualifying them for the role of attributing rights 
and protections to animals. This, of course, does not en-
tail prioritizing human interests over animal interests, in-
sofar as knowledge of species membership is hidden be-
hind the veil. But it does entail the priority of human 
judgment in the attribution of rights and the subsequent 
fulfillment of duties. Such a priority of human judgment 
in framing a contract is acknowledged by Andrew Co-
hen (2007) who argues that animals are owed direct 
moral considerability as stringent as that owed to ration-
al human agents. But animals acquire their moral status 
only indirectly via such agents in the framing process 
(Garner, 2012a; Smith, 2012).  
To be sure, there are many other versions of con-
tractualism applied to the rights of animals (see for ex-
ample Garner, 2012a, for an application of a Scanlonian 
contract). It is not our intention, however, to provide an 
exhaustive survey of them all. Instead, we wish only to 
emphasize the following point. Although they may be 
understood as attempting to embrace the value of spe-
cies egalitarianism, contractualist accounts of animal 
rights strongly reinforce the weak character of the claim 
to human/animal equality. Hence, contractual animal 
rights depend on the priority and sufficiency of human 
judgement in favor of animal welfare (Rowlands, 1997) 
or they render them dependent on human representa-
tives facilitating reasonable agreement about the desira-
bility of animals having any contractually-based rights 
(Garner, 2012b). Keeping in mind this priority of human 
judgment in the representation of animals, we turn next 
to the broadening of the appeal to values besides equali-
ty, such as liberty and fraternity, in the political turn. 
2. THE POLITICAL TURN AND THE BROAD
APPEAL TO LIBERTY AND FRATERNITY 
  According to Tony Milligan (2015), the political 
turn may be understood best as an attempt to downplay 
the importance of the value of egalitarianism for animal 
rights. Indeed, he argues that the appeal to equality in 
Singer and Regan leaves them vulnerable to their aboli-
tionist critics, such as Gary Francione (1996,  2008) and 
Joan Dunayer (2004). Here, abolitionists repudiate the 
weakening of species egalitarianism in Singer and Regan, 
which we have shown above to be reproduced in liberal 
contractualist accounts of animal rights. Indeed, they 
contend that if humans are to be regularly prioritized in 
their relations to animals, then the resulting hu-
man/animal relations are not really egalitarian at all. In-
stead, they should be understood as a continuation of 
speciesism. That the priority assigned to humans makes 
no reference to “humanity”— as a justificatory term of 
art—makes no difference: weak species egalitarianism is 
still speciesist, from this point of view. Consequently, 
abolitionists commit instead to a strong species egalitari-
anism ruling out any regularized priority of human over 
animals interests for whatever reasons (Regan, 1987).  
But this strong egalitarian commitment of abolition-
ism results in the closely related position of extinction-
ism. This entails rejecting all reformist approaches to an-
imal rights which take a pragmatic view of promoting 
animal interests under the mantle of rights. On the ex-
tinctionist view, if animal dependency on humans is an 
entrenched feature of human/animal relations, then the 
dependent animals should be prevented from breeding. 
Indeed, this is the only way to guarantee the prevention 
of similar relations of abusive dependency in the future. 
But we also note that extinctionism would equally be a 
criticism of contractualism in which human judgment is 
prioritized and—as in Garner’s (2012a) appropriation of 
Scanlon—prioritized in such a way as to leave the rights 
of animals entirely dependent on enough citizens rea-
sonably agreeing upon them as being “worthwhile.” In 
this respect, we would add to Milligan’s analysis that lib-
eral contractualism offers no better resource from within 
political theory for countering extinctionism than the 
ethical approaches of Singer and Regan. While it has 
been described in the pejorative as fundamentalist 
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(Garner, 2012b) and puritan (Milligan, 2015), extinction-
ism can, at least, be said to have the virtue of being fully 
consistent in its embrace of species egalitarianism. Nei-
ther the philosophical ethicists, Singer and Regan, nor 
the liberal contractualists, Rowlands and Garner, can 
make any such claim to consistency in their appeals to 
the value of equality with animals. All of them find it 
necessary, in one way or another, to significantly qualify 
their claims to equality between the species by appeal to 
differences between humans and animals in their capaci-
ties for autonomy and civic participation. 
Even if one were to reject as overblown the extinc-
tionist assertion that weak species egalitarianism is no 
more than speciesism under another name, one is left 
wondering why there should be such an emphasis on 
egalitarianism in animal rights discourse. To be sure, 
equality always contributes to our conception of rights 
and of what we owe to one another. But, as Milligan 
correctly notes, the effect of a singular overarching focus 
on equality is the almost total impoverishment of the 
values of liberty and fraternity. At any rate, this is the ef-
fect of such a focus if species egalitarianism is embraced 
in its strong sense. Here, liberty is reduced to an exclu-
sively negative form of non-interference. After all, in the 
case of those animals whose relations with us are charac-
terized by entrenched dependency, like most domestic 
animals, their liberation from such abusive dependency 
calls for their extinction (Burgess-Jackson, 1998). As 
Milligan soberly puts it, strong species egalitarianism 
means that any “positive obligations and socially based 
commitments to one another are easily lost sight of.” 
(2015, 10) Palmer (2010), Clement (2003), and Midgley 
(1983) famously foreground positive duties to animals 
based on relations. It is in this context of concern about 
the impoverishment of other values, such as positive lib-
erty and fraternity or solidarity, brought about by the 
singular focus on equality, that Milligan identifies the 
current political turn with Donaldson and Kymlicka’s 
Zoopolis (2011).   
Rather than making a sweeping appeal to species 
equality the center of their theory of what we owe to an-
imals, proponents of a zoopolis must relegate equality to 
a background role, as stressed by advocates of differen-
tially or relationally proscribed positive rights 
(Henderson, 2009). While acknowledging a background 
of equal universal rights of animals as sentient beings or 
subjects-of-a-life, they also foreground the particular, or 
differential, rights of various categories of animals: do-
mestic, sovereign, and liminal. In this respect, Don-
aldson and Kymlicka (2013) appeal to an analogy with 
the particular rights of national citizens, independent na-
tion states, and denizens (who claim various legal status-
es within our own national borders, ranging from tour-
ists and business travelers to asylum seekers). On this 
analogy, domestic animals are then seen as our domestic 
co-citizens, wild animals as wild sovereigns, and liminals 
as various sorts of denizens occupying various positions 
between co-citizen and wild sovereign. Hence, what we 
owe in terms of positive rights and duties to co-national 
citizens will relevantly differ from what we owe to the 
citizens of other sovereign countries and what we owe 
to denizens residing within our borders. Likewise, what 
we owe to domestic animals with whom we share our 
households will differ from what we owe to wild animals 
and what we owe to liminal animals. To be sure, Don-
aldson and Kymlicka’s analogy has been widely criticized 
for overgeneralizing human/animal relations that are 
considerably more complex than their rather simple tri-
partite framework allows (von Essen & Allen, 2016a). 
But the significance of their approach for sorting out 
patterns of human-animal relations and their associated 
positive obligations (Silverstein, 2013) remains vitally 
important. As Rogers puts it: “Animal rights theorists 
must either work within the theory put forward by Zo-
opolis or explain why not.” (Rogers, 2012, p. 510) 
This, then, shifts the focus of attention to the par-
ticularity of what we owe to animals, against the back-
drop of a weak species egalitarianism that is geared to 
recognizing ethically significant differences between 
humans and the variety of animals with whom we are 
differently related. The political import of this shift is 
that “the picture of liberty (i.e. animal liberation) … [be-
comes] both more robust and more plausible” as it is 
tied into an “account of solidarity, community, connec-
tion, or fellow feeling with other creatures” to whom 
quite different things are owed (Milligan, 2015, p. 10). 
This shift to the value of fraternity or solidarity may 
seem a bit surprising to anyone more familiar with dis-
cussions of solidarity with animals in the contexts of 
ecofeminism or care theory. Here, such internatural sol-
idarity is theorized in terms of sentiment rather than legal 
rights of political membership (Hailwood, 2012; von Es-
sen & Allen, in press). But animal rights are also a basis 
of fraternity or solidarity with other creatures in the ju-
ridical sense of demanding their legal recognition as 
members of the same political community, with many 
different kinds of protected statuses that must be re-
spected. Indeed, solidarity and justice mutually presup-
pose each other, where solidarity necessarily precedes le-
gal rights (Donovan, 1996). 
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Fraternity thus becomes the fraternity of rights-
holders: all those who are recognized by law, even 
though their recognition and statuses may vary. So, do-
mestic animals may be recognized as having a positive 
right to be included in household decisions, wild animals 
may be recognized as having (not only a negative right 
to sovereign non-interference but also) a positive right 
to assistance under particular circumstances in which the 
integrity of their separate communities are somehow 
threatened, and liminals may be recognized as having a 
positive right to, say, the continuation of traditional 
supplementary feeding practices. In the context of a 
much broader discourse of animal rights, liberty ceases 
to be about extinctionism, and assumes positive dimen-
sions. Animal liberation can thus mean many other 
things besides the extinction of species that are depend-
ent on humans, in one way or another (Horta, 2013).  
Although Milligan conceives of it as a turn away 
from abolitionism and extinctionism, the political turn 
instigated by Donaldson and Kymlicka might just as well 
be seen as a turn away from contractualism. At any rate, 
it may also be seen this way to the extent that contractu-
alism remains focused on offering “a single big response 
to the plight of all animals” (Milligan, 2015, p. 10) by 
pulling all animals generically into the domain of justice, 
rather than on identifying the many different kinds of 
duties that are owed to particular animals as a function 
of our particular positions in the zoopolity. But, contrary 
to Milligan who sees the turn as entailing a broader ap-
peal to liberal values, we argue next that it may more 
straightforwardly, and, in a hitherto underexplored way, 
also be understood as a turn towards republican political 
values in the context of animal rights.   
3. THE REPUBLICAN INTERPRETATION OF
THE POLITICAL TURN 
In this section, we argue that neo-republicanism is 
better positioned than liberalism to embrace a sufficient-
ly broad and robust appeal to liberty and fraternity, val-
ues with which the political turn in animal rights theory 
needs to engage in full. In particular, we argue that the 
neo-republican idea of liberty as a non-dominating polit-
ical relation can be shown to realize this aim. We previ-
ously appealed to neo-republicanism’s non-domination 
framework in the context of care and dependency as 
concerned the supplementary feeding of wild boar (von 
Essen & Allen, 2016b), but here we endeavor to super-
sede this position, considering the systemic character of 
animal non-domination. 
To be sure, we acknowledge that liberalism can ac-
commodate the positive dimension of liberty, along with 
the value of community or solidarity. But we contend 
that liberalism is less able than republicanism to transfer 
its distinctive conceptions of liberty and fraternity to our 
relationships to animals. So, in Rawls (1999) for in-
stance, the positive dimension of liberty is captured in 
the idea that the basic institutional structure of society 
should be arranged so as to facilitate citizens—
possessing a sense of justice—to realize their autono-
mous, self-chosen plan of life. Moreover, society is con-
ceived as a system of cooperation in which social goods 
are to be distributed fairly and in which each depends on 
the others for the realization of self-chosen individual 
goods. This presupposes fraternity in that society is 
united by its citizens’ sense of justice, whereby each is 
willing to recognize the legitimate claims of others to 
their fair share of social goods and their right to pursue 
their own individual good. It also presupposes civic du-
ties, such as civility, whereby each is willing to affirm 
shared public values when participating in public pro-
cesses of deliberating about the laws and holding offi-
cials to account.  
These liberal conceptions of liberty and fraternity, 
however, are not sufficiently robust for translation to 
non-human animals. It is highly questionable—and 
probably anthropocentric in the worst sense—to say 
that animals possess a sense of justice analogous to hu-
mans, let alone the sense of justice distinguishing the cit-
izens of the modern liberal state. It is also highly contro-
versial to suppose they possess powers of autonomy, in 
the traditional political meaning analogous to humans 
(Scruton, 2000; Hinchcliffe, 2015). To this extent, there 
can be no reciprocity between human and non-human 
animals in the system of interspecies social cooperation, 
each facilitating the other’s freedoms as co-participants 
in shaping the laws of the shared political community. 
But is there any reason to suppose that neo-
republicanism can offer any more robust conception of 
liberty and fraternity in our relations with animals? By 
contrast with liberty as autonomy within the system of 
social cooperation, neo-republicanism advances a con-
ception of liberty by virtue of non-dominating social re-
lations. Conceived in terms of relations between human 
participants of a political community, domination may 
be understood broadly as the exercise of arbitrary power 
over others. But the exercise of arbitrary power has a va-
riety of expressions.  
For instance, it can be understood simply as an ex-
ercise of arbitrary interpersonal power, as when the 
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gunman threatens his victim: “your money or your life.” 
This might be seen as a non-normative expression of ar-
bitrary power to the extent that the power exercised by 
the dominator is merely an expression of will unsupported 
by the norms and expectations of the wider social sys-
tem. But, in other cases, the power to dominate another 
has the backing of social structure (Richardson, 2002). 
So, the slave-master’s ability to exercise an arbitrary will 
over the slave has the normative backing of the institu-
tion of slave-holding. Moreover, domination might even 
be conceived in exclusively institutional and systemic 
terms without reference to interpersonal domination and 
the arbitrary will. This latter possibility of institutional 
domination may arise when the subjects of legal inter-
ference by the state cannot contest the particular rights 
and statuses that have been assigned to them within the 
system of social cooperation. Here, institutional or struc-
tural domination is the source of a controversy between 
domination theorists. 
On the one hand, Pettit (1999) argues that non-
domination entails both 1) that those public officials as-
signing rights and statuses to others must track their in-
terests as participants in social cooperation and 2) that 
the subjects of legal interference by the state must be 
able to challenge these assignments. On this view, it is 
ultimately the ability of the subjects of interference to 
act also as agents capable of challenging their assigned 
statuses within the system of cooperation that ensures a 
suitably non-arbitrary, reciprocal power relationship suf-
ficient for non-domination. On the other hand, Lovett 
(2010) and List (2006) argue that non-domination entails 
only that public officials track the interests of the sub-
jects of interference. In other words, embracing 1) while 
rejecting 2), Lovett and List do not see it as a condition 
for non-domination that the subjects of state interfer-
ence should also be agents capable of challenging their 
assigned rights and statuses. On this view, the ability to 
check interference is not held by the subjects of interfer-
ence exercising a counter-power of their own. Instead, it 
is held by a neutral agent as impartial third party exercis-
ing this power on behalf of the latter. But this neutral 
third party is not a deputized or proxy agent for the sub-
jects of interference, who exercise no power of their 
own. Indeed, such neutral third party invigilation con-
sists only of ensuring that the rules of social cooperation 
are properly enforced.  
From the point of view of our concern with neo-
republicanism as a route to animal non-domination, the 
Lovett and List position is highly significant. It is signifi-
cant in that it points to a relationship in which there is 
no reciprocal exercise of power between those who as-
sign rights and statuses and those to whom they are as-
signed. After all, as we noted in connection with Rawls’ 
liberal conception of liberty and fraternity, animals are 
not plausibly understood as autonomous agents capable 
of exercising reciprocal powers, in a system of interspe-
cies cooperation with humans. If it is possible to say—
consistent with Lovett and List— that non-domination 
does not entail reciprocal powers but only neutral third 
party invigilation of the rules, then animal non-
domination begins to look like a viable prospect for the 
interspecies political community. 
4. WISSENBURG’S ‘FEUDALISM’ OBJECTION
Before developing this prospect any further, how-
ever, we consider a skeptical response to a republican 
route to animal non-domination offered by Wissenburg 
(2014). Like us, Wissenburg interprets Donaldson and 
Kymlicka’s position in Zoopolis as closer to republicanism 
than liberalism. That is, it is closer to republicanism in-
sofar as it emphasizes particular duties of citizenship 
over the possession of equal universal rights as the quali-
fication for inclusion in the domain of justice. Unlike us, 
however, he interprets Donaldson and Kymlicka as 
more deeply committed to the application of citizenship 
theory to animals than we believe is really the case. In 
this respect, he stresses that, while animals can be “as-
cribed rights,” they “obviously cannot consciously be 
rights-wielders,” claiming their rights against other 
members of the zoopolity (2014, p. 39). But, “even less 
can they be active republican citizens, acknowledging or per-
forming duties” to fulfill rights claims that could be 
made against them by other members of this political 
community, human or animal (Wissenberg, 2014, p. 39; 
emphasis added). In other words, they cannot plausibly 
be understood as agents, exercising or wielding any of 
those rights that are assigned to them, let alone wielding 
a right to contest the rights and statuses that have been 
ascribed to them, which Pettit takes as the ultimate guar-
antee of non-domination.  
Hence, Wissenburg insists that the relationship of 
humans to animals may well be fraternal to the extent 
humans recognize extensive interrelationships with ani-
mals, assigning particular rights and statuses to them as 
fellow members of the zoopolity. But he also stresses 
that this is necessarily a fraternal relationship of benevo-
lent domination. Certainly, it is domination on Pettit’s 
account of domination above. Consequently, Wissen-
burg believes that human/animal fraternity is more plau-
sibly understood by analogy with a feudal political order 
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than with a republic. As feudalist rather than republican, 
he contends that the political turn in animal rights 
should be conceived as “animal inclusive” but flatly 
“non-egalitarian” (Wissenberg, 2014, p. 31), thus reject-
ing even the weak species egalitarianism we have taken 
as baseline in both liberalism and republicanism. To this 
extent, his formula of animals being ascribed rights they 
cannot wield proves compatible with what we have 
called the priority of human judgment, in both the liber-
al and republican interpretations of the political turn. 
Indeed, it is precisely this priority of judgment that de-
fines his conception of feudalism for animals. According 
to Wissenburg, feudalism means that “to each animal 
subject a different role is assigned, with different and une-
qual rights-claims, not necessarily in a hierarchical but ra-
ther in an organic structure—albeit with, at the top of 
this Body Ecologic, the human brain that is tasked with the 
perpetual reflection on, and is aware of its responsibility for, har-
mony among its constituent parts” (Wissenberg, 2014, p. 
43; emphasis added).  
But does this view of a fraternal interspecies rela-
tionship in which animals cannot be conceived as agents 
wielding or exercising the rights assigned to them, and in 
which the priority of human judgment necessarily pre-
vails, have to be understood as benevolent domination? 
We note that, although failing to meet Pettit’s conditions 
for non-domination, it is less obvious that Wissenburg’s 
“feudalism” fails to meet the condition for non-
domination set by Lovett and List. That is, animals can-
not enjoy a fraternal relationship of non-domination to 
the extent that they cannot be agents contesting the dif-
ferent and unequal statuses assigned to them by human 
members of the zoopolis. But they can enjoy such a rela-
tion to the extent that unequal rights and statuses, de-
rived from public officials’ deep reflection on, and 
awareness of responsibility for, the harmony of the zo-
opolis and its system of interspecies cooperation, are the 
subject of neutral third party invigilation. Let us say that 
the officials take seriously their responsibility to assign 
rights and statuses to animal differentially by tracking 
their interests, as cooperating members of the zoopolis. 
As long as neutral independent agencies hold the power 
to check interferences by public officials deviating from 
the rules of cooperation established through their differ-
ential assignments of rights and statuses throughout the 
zoopolity, such agencies could be said to ensure the real-
ization of interspecies non-domination, in the sense 
proposed by Lovett and List.  
With appropriate third party invigilation and proper 
enforcement of the rules of interspecies cooperation, a 
check is placed on the prospects for interpersonal domi-
nation derived from non-normative exercises of an arbi-
trary will that simply flouts the rules. But can it still be 
argued that such invigilation establishes a mode of sys-
temic domination? In other words, is the impartial en-
forcement of rules, sanctioning interferences that cannot 
be challenged by the subjects of interference, itself a 
mode of domination? In this regard, Blunt (2015) criti-
cizes Lovett and List on the ground that their concep-
tion of “non-domination” would be consistent with an 
idealized form of apartheid entailing reflections on, and 
awareness of responsibility for, inferior races to whom 
rights and statues must be assigned unequally, establish-
ing a system of rules to be neutrally administered by an 
impartial third party invigilator. Appealing to such an 
idealization of apartheid, Blunt concludes that the as-
signment of rights absent the power of agency to contest 
these assignments fails the test of reflective equilibrium. 
It fails this test insofar as it fails to measure up to our 
considered judgments of what justice entails, in light of 
the best available empirical evidence about the world in 
which we live together.    
5. FINDING THE ROUTE TO ANIMAL NON-
DOMINATION 
However, we wish to consider the possibility that 
the non-reciprocal character of the interspecies relation-
ship, in which rights and statuses are assigned to animals 
who themselves lack the powers of agency to challenge 
such assignments, can prove consistent with neo-
republican non-domination. Here, we stress that the 
problem with the Lovett and List position does not lie in 
the idea that non-domination can be achieved without 
the subjects of interference also playing the role of 
agents who may contest the statuses assigned to them by 
public officials. Rather, it lies in their denial of any role 
for a third party as deputized or proxy agent for the sub-
jects of interference, holding the power to contest their 
assigned statuses on their behalf. Indeed, Lovett and 
List’s third party tracks interests and enforces the rules, 
but without ever contesting the rules. Nonetheless, the 
notion that a contestatory power may be wielded on be-
half of the subjects of interference is familiar enough in 
the neo-republican tradition insofar as parliamentary 
representatives function as deputies or proxies for the 
people, acting by the leave of the people (Pettit, 1999; 
Maynor, 2003). Indeed, such deputized or proxy repre-
sentation avoids the problem of systemic domination to 
which the Lovett and List position is vulnerable. It does 
so by ensuring a mediated form of reciprocity between 
POLITICS AND ANIMALS ISSUE 2 I FALL I 2016
www.politicsandanimals.org 
Copyright © 2016, Authors. 
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the CC-BY 4.0 license.
21
those assigning statuses and those to whom they are as-
signed, thus removing the need for the latter directly to 
wield the power of contestation for themselves. None-
theless, it obviously also continues to appeal to their 
agency in the electoral selection of their proxy agents as 
parliamentary representatives.  
But, if systemic domination may be avoided 
through the selection of deputized or proxy agents in 
the case of human participants in the zoopolity, then 
this does not easily translate to animal participants who 
lack equivalent powers of agency in interspecies cooper-
ation. Not, at any rate, unless we are willing to assign 
voting rights to animals, thereby committing the error of 
thinking about animals as if they were capable of exer-
cising equal citizenship rights, which motivated Wissen-
burg’s rejection of republicanism in favor of feudalism. 
Does this mean that the problem of systemic domina-
tion remains for animals in the zoopolis, such that there 
is no neo-republican route to animal non-domination? 
In this regard, it might be argued that there is no such 
route. Certainly, we can conceive of third party proxy 
agents for animals. For example, we might appeal to the 
role played by any number of animal rights NGOs, 
claiming to represent the interests of animals who can-
not speak for themselves, in the public, political fora of 
a republic. Such organizations are not neutral invigilators 
of the rules, but rather challenge these rules on behalf of 
those they claim to represent as their proxy agents. 
Hence, if the proxy representation of animals results in 
any kind of systemic domination in the zoopolis, then 
this would be for an entirely different reason from that 
identified by Lovett and List. Systemic domination 
would result not from neutral but uncritical invigilation 
of the rules, but rather from the inability of the animals 
to exercise political agency in selecting the proxies claim-
ing to represent their interests in public fora. Further, it 
would be a function of their inability to exercise such 
agency in contesting how the proxies go about represent-
ing them in these fora (see von Essen & Allen, 2016a).   
In fact, this might be seen as analogous to another 
version of idealized apartheid, one in which only white 
people as the proxy representatives of black people hold 
the power to contest the rules of inter-racial coopera-
tion, and black people cannot contest how they are repre-
sented by whites. Here, the idealization has nothing to 
do with the neutrality of invigilation. Instead, it is that 
the white people sincerely believe—on the basis of the 
racist norms to which they subscribe—they are repre-
senting the best interests of black people when challeng-
ing the rules on their behalf. To this extent, they do not 
exercise a merely arbitrary, non-normative will in their 
relationships to blacks. Nonetheless, there is an obvious 
disanalogy between this version of apartheid based on 
whites proxy representing blacks and humans proxy rep-
resenting animals. The disanalogy is that blacks in the 
modified version of apartheid do possess powers of 
agency to contest these rules for themselves or to select 
their representative to speak and act on their behalf. 
Consequently, the modified version of idealized apart-
heid is still systemically dominating in that the apartheid 
system refuses to recognize that the subjects of interfer-
ence could also be political agents.   
 In this respect, such a system clearly fails the test of 
reflective equilibrium proposed by Blunt insofar as re-
fusing to recognize the political agency of participants in 
cooperation who are capable of exercising such agency 
does not square with our considered judgments of the 
entailments of justice, especially given the lack of any 
sound empirical support for racist norms and ideology. 
But it surely is consistent with our considered judgments 
about justice to say that the proxy representation of 
those who do not select their own proxies may be ap-
propriately non-dominating. At any rate, this is con-
sistent with our considered judgments, provided there 
are good reasons to believe that the subjects of interfer-
ence are genuinely incapable of exercising agency on 
their own behalf and the proxies who claim to represent 
their interests can make defensible and contestable 
claims about their best interests. An obvious example 
would be the proxy representation of the severely cogni-
tively disabled. By contrast with the modified apartheid 
example, the best available empirical evidence here may 
well show the subjects of interference to be incapable of 
also exercising powers of agency, in the relevant senses 
of contesting interference in public fora or selecting 
proxies (Wong, 2010).  
Of course, proxy representation of the interests of 
those who cannot represent themselves or select their 
representatives remains controversial, even in the case of 
the severely cognitively disabled. But it is not so contro-
versial that it cannot ever pass the test of reflective equi-
librium.  Controversy arising from such third party rep-
resentation has less to do with whether it aligns with our 
considered judgments about what we owe to those lack-
ing relevant powers of agency, human or animal, than 
the rigor with which claims to be a proxy representative 
have been publicly deliberated, in light of the best avail-
able empirical information concerning their interests (see 
von Essen & Allen, in press). To this extent, we believe 
that it is as misleading to talk about feudalism for ani-
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mals as it would be to talk about feudalism for severely 
cognitively disabled humans. In both cases, proxy repre-
sentation rather than neutral invigilation may establish a 
route to non-domination appropriate to the situation of 
those incapable of exercising powers of political agency 
in open public deliberation challenging the present rules 
of cooperation.  
CONCLUSION 
 We have argued for a neo-republican route to ani-
mal non-domination. Consistent with the political turn 
in animal rights theory, we argued for engagement with 
the ideas of liberty and fraternity over the appeal to spe-
cies egalitarianism motivating the early movement of an-
imal rights and animal liberation. In its extreme aboli-
tionist and extinctionist forms, animal liberation came to 
mean the liberation of animals from all human interfer-
ence, leaving no room for animal liberation and a right 
to fraternity with humanity in a zoopolis. In its contrac-
tualist form, liberalism did not recommend such an ex-
treme view of animal liberation from humanity, but nei-
ther did it do any better in terms of conceiving of a soli-
daristic interspecies political community. We argued, 
however, that neo-republicanism can conceive of such a 
community in which animals may be liberated from in-
terpersonal and systemic domination by humans. Above 
all, we argued that this calls not for Lovett and List’s 
conception of non-domination as neutral third party in-
vigilation, but rather for proxy representations of animal 
interests that retain Pettit’s emphasis on the contestation 
of interferences. Here, contestation is not undertaken by 
the subjects of interference, but this is consistent with 
our considered judgment regarding subjects of interfer-
ence who lack the appropriate powers of political agen-
cy.  
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